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ABSTRACT
We model the decision to invest in residential energy conservation capital as an
irreversible investment in the face of price uncertainty. The irreversible nature of this
investment means that there is a value to waiting to invest (an option value) which helps
explain the low rate of conservation investment as a result of the residential energy tax credit.
Simulations suggest that a tax credit of the type implemented from 1978 through 1985 will
not increase conservation investment significantly.
We investigate the empirical evidence on the effectiveness of credits using data from a
panel data set of roughly 38,000 individual tax returns followed over a three year period from
1979-1981. Unlike previous work, we find that the energy tax credit is statistically significant
in explaining the probability of investing. Our estimates suggest that increasing the federal
credit by 10 percentage points would increase the percentage of households claiming the
credit from 5.7% to 7.1%.
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and NBERL. Introduction
There is an extensive literature which documents that a
significant number of energy conservation investments, which by
any reasonable measure have a very high rate of return, are net
undertaken (see, for example, Williams and Ross (1980) and
Carlsmith et al (1990)). This literature in the past has argued
that a variety of market barriers, e.g. fuel price distortions,
lack of information, etc., discourage these investments1.
While many of these market barriers may exist, we believe
that an important explanation for this low rate of investment is
the uncertainty over the path of future energy prices.Key to
this explanation is the recognition of the irreversible nature of
many home energy improvements which frequently involve structural
alteration of one's residence.This paper develops a model of
home energy investment which formally incorporates this feature.2
We then apply this model to evaluate the effectiveness of an
energy tax credit for conservation investment along the lines of
the Residential Energy Tax Credit which was in effect from 1978
through 1985. We first develop a set of energy price and
investment simulations based on the model to investigate how
1 Sutherland (1991) summarizes and raises objections to many of
the common market failures that are proposed to explain the
"energy paradox".
In a recent paper, Jaf fee and Stavins (1991) attempt to
incorporate many of the market barrier features described above
into an economic model.They focus on the relative merits of
price based controls versus regulation to increase conservation
investment and do not consider irreversibility and price
uncertainty in their model.
1uncertainty over future prices affects the decision to invest in
conservation capital. We also consider how different tax
policies might affect the rate of investment. We calibrate these
simulations to aggregate data under a variety of assumptions
about the nature of stochastic prices facing investors. The
simulation results based upon the moments of the relevant price
processes replicatethepattern ofresidentialenergy
conservation investment observed in the United States during the
late 1970s and early l980s and suggest that it is unnecessary to
appeal to myriad ad hoc market failures in order to explain the
"energy paradox". Irreversibility and uncertainty alone can
explain the observed adoption rates quite well, and we view both
to be reasonable features of a model of residential conservation
investment. In order to evaluate our approach more thoroughly,
we then analyze a large data set on individual federal tax
returns in the United States over the three year period 1979-
1981. This data set has extensive information on energy
conservation investment made by individuals which, combined with
state level energy and weather data, allows us to investigate the
impact of conservation incentive programs on individuals'
investment decisions. Unlike previous authors, we find, as the
theory would suggest, statistically significant tax credit
effects on residential conservation investment; the size of these
effects is consistent with the predictions of the model.
In the next section we present our model of conservation
investment in the presence of price uncertainty. We then provide
2simulation results which explore both the speed of technology
diffusion and the size of tax credit effects in our model. Some
background on conservation investment incentives at the federal
and state level precedes our empirical work.We close with a
brief conclusion.
.L A Model Irreversible Energy Improvement
In this section, we sketch out a simple model of the
decision to invest in conservation measures to reduce energy
consumption.3Key to our analysis is the assumption that the
investment in energy conservation capital is irreversible.
Typical conservation investments include ceiling and wall
insulation, storn doors and windows and caulking; the salvage
value of any of these investments is likely to be very low.
Because of this, as is well known in the literature on
irreversible decisions, there is an option value associated with
n investing which contributes to a slowdown in the rate of
investment.
Assume that the price of energy (P) varies across
individuals and time according to a geometric Brownian motion
process:
(1) dP1 =uPdt+oPtdz
where z, is a standardized Brownian motion (Wiener) process whose
change dz has mean zero and unit variance. The change in P
over time t has mean &t and variance ot. Similarly, we assume
This model could also be used to analyze renewable energy
investment.
3that the price of conservation capital (K1t) varies over time and
(perhaps) individuals according to a geometric Brownian motion
process:
(2) dK1kXltdt +
wherez is a Wiener process with dzk having mean zero and unit
variance. The correlation between z, and z is denoted by p.
The lifetime cost of energy use for a risk neutral household
is composed of three parts.The first part is the stream of
energy costs prior to undertaking an energy conservation
investment.The second part is the stream of costs after the
conservation investment is made. The third part is the cost of
the investment itself. We assume that the household chooses an
optimal strategy at time zero to determine when to make the
conservation investment to minimize the expected value of the
present discounted value of lifetime energy costs (including the
conservation capital costs)
(3) E{ }pit dt +f(1—i)it et dt + Kj1 eflT
In equation (3), is the discount rate for the it2individual,
is the savings in energy costs due to the conservation
investment expressed as a fraction of energy costs and T, the
time at which investment occurs (which could be infinite).
Equation (3) can be rewritten so that the problem becomes
one of maximizing expected energy savings:
(4) E {$S e dt —x11 ehiT+ :Pmtettdt }
Formulatedinthis fashion, the problem now is clearly one of
4choosing an optimal sequential decision rule which selects the
time to make an irreversible investment which has a revenue
stream of jP per period at investment cost Kit. As we show in
the appendix, the optimal time to invest in the energy
conservation capital occurs when:
b
(5) IPIT > —(—,)K,
where
.5 —+J(.S 02—a)2 + 2(TtlLK) Q•
(6) b=
0
In equation (6), QQ2is the variance and is the drift of the
hybrid geometric Brownian motion process Pit/Kit (see the
appendix for details). The term b will be greater than one if a
+ < v, that is, if the trend in the geometric Brownian motion
process of Pit/Kit (adjusted for the trend in capital costs) is
less than the individual's disOount rate. This condition is
essentially the condition that it be optimal for the individual
to make an investment in the energy capital in finite time.
As approaches zero, the term b/(b—l) approaches one,
and the investment rule in equation (5) collapses to the
Marshallian investment criterion that one should invest if the
present discounted value of the savings, P/( —)exceeds the
cost of investment K. With stochastic prices, however, the
investment rule is scaled up by the factor b/(b-1) > 1.Thus,
individuals might choose not to invest even though the return
substantially exceeds their cost of funds, something consistent
5with the survey data showing "low" responsiveness, because the
gain to waiting, summarized by b/(b—l), is high. Moreover,
studies (e.g.Hausinan (1982)) which ignore the impact of
irreversibility on the decision by a homeowner to purchase
appliances would necessarily significantly overstate the discount
rate used by consumers.
Havingestablishedthatuncertainty combinedwith
irreversibility can reduce the amount of investment made in
conservation capital, we next turn to stochastic simulations of
our model, in order to explore more fully the impact of
irreversibility on the diffusion of new technologies.We also
analyze the impact of tax policy on the diffusion process in this
setting.
Simulations theg Investment
There has been a substantial literature analyzing the
diffusion of technology dating back to Griliches (1957). A
stylized fact emerging from this literature is that the adoption
of new technologies occurs subject to an S—shaped curve4. What
is striking about the energy conservation experience in the 1970s
is the very slow rate of diffusion of new technologies. This has
led to considerable speculation that information about new
technologies has not spread sufficiently rapidly or that capital
market failures might deter investment.
4 See Jovanovic and Lach (1989) for a review of the literature
on diffusion as well as a theory based on learning by doing.One need not appeal to market imperfections, however, to
generate extremely slow diffusion processes. Consider the
following example. Assume that individuals have identical
preferences. If were the same for everyone, then we would
observe no investment until equation (5) were satisfied at which
point everyone would invest. However, even with identical
preferences, there will be a distribution of ex ante expected
improvements (). Putdifferently, the housing stock is
heterogeneous and there exists considerable variation in the
gains from particular energy improvements. Hence as P/K rises,
people who will reap large savings from a particular energy
conservation investment will invest first while people with lower
expected gains wait for P/K to rise further5. To illustrate the
diffusion pattern which emerges from our model, we present
simulation results from a model where the energy savings
parameter, ,isnormally distributed with mean 0.2 and standard
deviation .1, values chosen to correspond roughly to existing
engineering estimates of the return to these investments.
For the purposes of simulations, we estimated the trend and
variance of the price process P/K using data on energy prices and
capital over the period 1955 through 1981, the last year of data
This is an example of the "probit" type diffusion model (viz.
Stoneman (1983)). We note, however, that this argument is much
morepowerful whencombinedwith an.assumption of
irreversibility, which provides an S—Shaped adoption curve
and the potential for extremely slow adoption rates.We also
prefer our formulation because the diffusion comes about because
of a heterogeneous housing stock, not because of ad-hoc
assumptions of preference heterogeneity.used in the empirical work described below. The household fuel
oil price index was used as a measure of P while the durable
comitiodities price index was used as a measure of K.Data were
taken from the Economic Report President. Assuming that
P/K follows geometric Brownian motion, we obtain estimates of a
equal to .046 and and o equal to .093.In order to help gauge
the effect of the irreversibility assumption we also provide
simulations assuming there is no uncertainty, which drives the
option value to zero. Figure 1 presents the price process and
Figure 2 the rate of cumulative investment over a 20 year horizon
when o =0.The hurdle rule is the traditional Marshallian one.
figure 2 shows that investment rises dramatically with 40% of
households making conservation improvements within 5 years and
99% by 20 years.
Contrast this result with the cumulative investment in the
case where o =.093.Figure 3 shows the price process and
figure 4 the rate of investment. The price process is started at
the same value (Pa) as in the certainty case (figure 1). With a
real discount rate of .05, b equals 1.31 and b/(b—l) equals 4.23.
With these assumptions, the rate of investment is remarkably
slow, with many intervening years of no investment at all.
Cumulative investment after 20 years is less than 5%. Note that
the price both increases and decreases over the 20 year period.
Thus there are periods of rapid investment followed by periods of
no investment which can last as long as six years.
Figure 5 shows the results of a set of 500 replications of
8the price process and cumulative investment under uncertainty.
The trend and variance of the price process is the same in the
replications, matching the moments used for figure 3. The figure
shows that the dispersion in investment increases with time as
would be expected given that the price process follows geometric
Brownian motion. At the end of the 10th year, the mean
cumulative investment is 7.5% with a standard deviation of 4.7%.
Minimum investment is 2.5% and the maximum is 31%. As figure 5
shows, cases with cuu1ative investment after 10 years as large
as 15% are quite rare.Hence we do not attribute our results
showing low investment under price uncertainty to the particular
price process that we generated in figure 3.
Figures 6 and 7 show the effect of instituting a 15% tax
credit on the purchase of the conservation capital at time t—l.
For the certainty case (figure6), the stimulation to investment
is dramatic.Investment increases from about 27% to 43% as a
direct result of the credit.Investment after 5 years is now
about 60% versus 40% without the credit.However, with the
geometric Brownian motion assumption, the credit is much less
effective (figure 7).Investment increases by .2 % as a direct
result of the credit and by less than 3% after 20 years6.
Of course, with the investment trigger increased by a factor
of 4, these results are perhaps not surprising. But note that if
6 This result is general. In a series of 1000 replications, the
mean increase in investment is .2% at t=l with a standard
deviation of .11%. The maximum increase is .57%.
9individuals weighted recent energy price data more heavily when
they make subjective estimates of ,oo,and b, the adjustment
factor would be even larger. Using data from 1960 through 1981
gives estimates of b/(b—l) of 7.65.
The simulation results show in a striking way that
uncertainty can sharply reduce investment in conservation
capital. Moreover, a tax credit can have a significant effect on
increasing investment —tothe order of doubling the probability
of investing in conservation capital. However, in the presence
of price uncertainty, the probability of investing is so low that
doubling the investment probability has negligible effects on
total conservation investment. In the next section, we turn to a
closer examination of the state and federal tax incentives that
existed in the late 70s and early 80s which will provide the
basis for an empirical examination of the actual response of
residential conservation investment to tax incentive programs.
IV. Tax Policy Toward Conservation Investment
Tax incentives to stimulate conservation investment existed
during the l970s-l980s at both the federal and state level.As
most state programs "piggy backed" on the federal system, we
discuss the latter program in greater detail. We also discuss
how previous researchers have tried to measure the effectiveness
of the tax incentives at stimulating investment.
The Energy Tax Act of 1978 (ETA78) provided homeowners with
tax credits to encourage conservation investment activities such
as insulating walls and ceilings, replacing furnace burners and
10ignition systems, storm or thermal windows and doors, installing
clock thermostats, and weatherstripping. These investments
received a credit of 15%, with a credit ceiling set at $300 and
could only be taken on houses that were constructed prior to
1977.
In addition to the federal credit, nine states offered a
conservation incentive (either a deduction or a credit) over the
period 1979 through 1985 when the federal credit expired.8 These
state programs will be important in the econometric work below as
they provide variation in the tax price of conservation
investment which allows us to identify the importance of the
programs in stimulating investment.
Given the broad coverage and low cost of some highly
productive improvements, one might think that the credits would
be universally claimed. Surprisingly, this is not the case.
Table 1 presents information from the Statistics Income on the
fraction of returns which claimed the credit for either
conservation or renewable energy activities. The credit is most
ETA78 also encouraged investment in solar, wind and geothermal
energy equipment used to heat, cool, and supply hot water or
electricity to the principle residence. These investments
received a higher credit, with 30% of the first $2000 and 20% of
the next $10,000 qualifying for the credit, with a maximum credit
of $2600.ETA78 was amended by the Crude Oil Windfall Profits
Tax Act of 1980, which increased the tax credits available for
renewable systems to 40% of up to $10,000 in expenditure.The
credit for these investments was available to all principle
residences regardless of when built.
8Arizona, California, Colorado, Hawaii, Montana, and Oregon
offered credits of some form while Arkansas, Idaho, and Indiana
offered deductions.Information on these programs comes from
Walsh (1987) and tax forms.
11heavily taken in 1978 where 6.5%. of the returns claimed a
credit. Note that the energy tax credit was retroactively
applied beginning April 20, 1977. Credits for investments made
in 1977 could be taken in 1978; hence the data for 1978 cover
roughly 20 months.The fraction of returns filing the credit
drops from 6.5% in 1978 to roughly 3% by 1985, the last year in
which the credit could be taken.
One might think that conservation credits might be
fraudulently claimed, or that, unaware of the possibility of
taking them, taxpayers may fail to claim a credit they ought to.
Fortunately, the TCMP audit data allow us to analyze the extent
to which mistakes or frauds occur. The 1986 TCMP data indicate
that of the 560 million dollars of tax credits claimed in 1985,
531 million were legitimate, and an additional 28 million
allowable claims which were not originally reported were
discovered.These numbers are typical of those for most items
covered by the audit, and indicate that fraud or mistakes will
not be an important source of measurement error in the empirical
work we present below .
InTable 2, we report the distribution of returns for 1979
by income and the fraction of credit takers in each group along
with the fraction homeowners.The probability of taking the
credit rises with income and reaches a peak of 15.67% for returns
in the $50,000 to $100,000 group.For the group with AGI less
9 We thank Joel Slemrod for providing this information.
12than $10,000, the fraction of takers is 1.21%, roughly a third of
the fraction of takers in the next income group.
Table 3 reports the fraction of credit takers and mean
conservation expenditures by state for 1979 along with the
average credit for those who took the credit in each state. The
geographic distribution of the propensity to take the federal
credit for the most part is not surprising.However, certain
states stand out, California most prominently. With the
exception of Hawaii, California had the lowest fraction of credit
takers of all the states. California's state conservation
incentive program is unique in offering a very generous credit
for conservation activity (40% of costs). However, the credit is
net of the federal credit.For most households, it is simply
easier to claim the entire 40% on the state return than claim 15%
on the federal return and the remaining 25% on the state return.
Thus the low participation rate in the federal program for
California reflects a measurement problem, a problem we address
in the estimation strategy below.
Results of previous research on the effectiveness of energy
tax incentive programs have been relatively inconclusive. This
literature consists of a small series of survey studies, (Pitts
and Wittenbach (1981), Carpenter and Chester (1984), Peterson
(1985)) and three econometric analyses (Cameron (1985), Walsh
(1987),(l989) and Dubin and Henson (1988)). The survey studies
indicate that the tax credits are important motivators for
purchases of renewable energy improvements,but not for
13conservation.
Cameron does not directly estimate the additional investment
resulting from federal and state incentive programs but rather
estimates the price elasticity of investment for energy
conservation and renewable investment. Using cross section data
from the National Interim Energy Consumption Survey of 1977—78,
she constructs and estimates a nested logit model over many
improvement alternatives and finds significant price sensitivity,
suggesting that credits might provide an important stimulus.
One problem with the approach used by Cameron is that it is
assumed that changes in price due to the implementation of tax
credits will have the same effect as direct changes in investment
costs.This will be true in a world in which the transaction
costs of taking the credit are minimal and in which information
about the tax incentives are widely dispersed.Moreover, one
must have a positive tax liability to benefit from the credit.
In the absence of these conditions, the tax credit changes in
price may induce less investment than an equivalent direct change
in price.
Walsh (1987,1989), using Department of Energy data and state
level variation in tax credits, attempts to test directly
whether the tax incentives at the federal or state level induce
additional conservation investment.He found that the states
which had high energy tax credits experienced very low
conservation investment activity. In a cross section regression,
he finds a significant negative effect of tax credits on
14investment.
Dubin and Henson, used a cross section of IRS audits for
1979 and related energy conservation activity to state level
temperature data and individual characteristics.10They found
that investment increases with income and that it responds to
measures, such as "heating degree days", which help predict its
return. While the coefficient on a dummy variable for the
existence of a state credit for conservation is positive in a
regression with federal tax credit claimed as the dependent
variable, it is statistically insignificant with a t statistic of
roughly .3.
Thus, the only evidence relating the tax incentives to
investment activity suggests that they have been ineffective,
although investment does respond to other variables that enhance
its profitability. We believe that there are two major reasons
why these studies have been unable to find a statistically and
economically significant relationship between the tax incentive
programs and investment.First there are individual and state
specific effects which are likely to be correlated with the
explanatory variables. State specific effects include the
measurement error noted for California as a result of the nature
of the state incentive program. Individual specific effects
include individual propensities toinvest in conservation
10The unit of observation in their study is an average of
returns from a TCNP cross tabulation. This limits the
effectiveness of individual variables. Our data is also IRS data
but consists of individual returns.
15equipment. These might include conservation "taste" factors as
well as attributes of the housing stock that individuals choose.
Second, many of the state tax incentive programs are deduction
programs. A dollar of deduction reduces taxable income by 1 and
tax liability by m where m is the marginal tax rate. Therefore,
the tax price of one dollar's worth of investment is 1—rn.
Measuring the tax price accurately for residents of states with
deduction incentives is important. We use the NBER TAXSIM state
tax calculator to measure the tax price at the individual level.
In the next section, we describe our data set and present results
from a set of regressions where we measure the responsiveness of
residential conservation investment to changes in state tax
incentives. -
V.Empirical
As the last two simulations in section III suggest, an
important question is whether tax policy can substantially affect
the decision to invest in conservation capital.We test the
effectiveness of tax incentives directly by estimating the effect
of state tax incentive programs on the decision to invest in a
discrete choice framework. To do this, we exploit the
information filed on federal returns by tax payers claiming the
federal residential energy conservation tax credit along with
variations in state level tax incentives.
The regression estimates are from a reduced farm model in
which the dependent variable (' is a binary variable
indicating whether the tax payer has an expenditure for
16conservation investment. We relate this to a vector of
explanatory variables which theory suggests should help determine
the payoffs to investing. As discussed previously, it is also
important to account for individual heterogeneity or fixed
effects11. Assuming the probability of making the investment has
the extreme value distribution, then
eai+1t
(9) P(I1=l) =____________
Followingthe suggestion of Chamberlain (1980), we condition the
likelihood function on making an expenditure at least once. This
latter probability will equal the sum of the probabilities that
ZIequals 1, 2, and so on. To see how this solves the problem
of heterogeneity, consider the probability that I =1in a
two period model where P(l,0) is defined as the joint probability
of taking the credit in the first year and not taking it in the
second year. P(0,l) is similarly defined.
(10) P(I1=1) =P(1,0)+P(01)
Consider the probability that we observe P(0,1) conditional on
the sum being equal to 1:
11 The likely direction of the fixed effects bias may well explain
previous estimates which found the wrong sign on the tax credit
variable. If a state is populated by citizens who have a higher
than average probability of investing because of unobservables,
it may be that that state has a low probability of introducing a
credit program. This type of interaction is consistent with the
evidence provided below.











In the last step we can factor out e and we are left with a
contribution to the likelihood function which does not include
Since we have T>2 the problem becomes significantly more
complex. Note, for example, the P(E 1tt=1) =
P(I=O)P(I=O) P(I=l) +P(I=O)P(I=O)...P(I=1)P(I=O)+...
Thecontribution to the likelihood of the individual who takes a
credit in period K will be:
T
(12) P(O,O,O,...,l,O,O)/P(E il)
Clearly this is quite a complicated expression, although the
likelihoodfunctionisstill globally concaveandits
maximization is straightforward.
If we want to allow for EI>lthen we have to consider all the
possible ways each of the sums could be obtained, but the fixed
effect will still disappear. The number of possibilities will be
18with K successes in T trials, for each k.
Unlike a fixed effects regression model with a continuous
dependent variable, we cannot "back out" estimates of the fixed
effects and forecast the dependent variable. Thus we are unable
to answer the question "How does increasing x change the
probability of making a conservation investment?". However,
Chamberlain (1989) shows that
P(lIx=x")P(lIx=x') (13) ln / = (x—x
P(OIx=x)P(OIx=x
whichis of interest, and doesn't depend on a because the odds
format makes the a's cancel. Thus we can answer the question,
"By what proportion will the probability of an agent taking the
action increase?".
We utilize data from tax returns for households followed
over the 3 year period from 1979 through 1981. The tax data are
drawn from the Ernst and Young! University of Michigan Tax
Research Database which consists of a simple random sample of
returns drawn by Social Security Number for the tax years 1979
through 198612. The number of returns each year varies from 9235
to 46,67013. From these returns we are able to construct a three
12 We have also experimented with using the full sevenyear panel (1979-1985 -thereis no energy investment information on the
1986 returns).The number of returns falls to roughly 6,000
which limits significantly the number of credit takers.
13Column 5 of Table 1 provides information on the sampling
frequency while column 2 shows how many returns were filed that
year.
19year panel which follows 37,658individuals. We have information
on each individual's state of residence, income,number of
dependents, and home mortgage and property taxes (fromwhich we
can infer home ownership status). There is alsoinformation on
whether they filed an energy tax credit form, how large a credit
they received and their expenditures on the conservation portion.
In addition, there is detailed information on expenditures by
sub—categories (e.g. storm windows, insulation) .Finally,as
noted above, we can compute a measure of the tax price for
conservation investment using TAXSIM.
We merged tax data with data on energy prices from the
Department of Energy State Energy Price and Expenditure Data
System (SEPEDS). This data set has detailed price and
expenditure information by state and year on the residential
sector for various energy sources.In the regression results
reported below, we use the price for petroleum14. We divide this
price by a price index for insulation to obtain our measure of
P— Notethat the index varies across states but not
Kit
individuals within the state. Sample statistics for the data set
are provided in table 4.
Sefore turning to the reduced form logit results, there are
several modifications of the estimating equation that we make.
First we note that the theory suggests that the probability of
14 We have also experimented with using alternative price series.
Results are not in any way significantly altered by which set of
prices we use.
20investing depends on the price ratio net of the state tax
incentive.Let U be the tax price of investment.For those
states which offer a credit, U equals 1 —c,where c is the state
credit.For states which offer a deduction, U equals 1 —
wheret is the individual's marginal tax rate.Then we could
p
redefine the price as —.Sincethe federal tax credit is in
nl<
effect the entire time of our analysis, we may ignore that
credit. The alternative approach and the one that we prefer is
to include U separately in the regression. We do this to account
for the possibility that the existence of the state level tax
incentive itself may have some positive effect on investment.
Alternatively, the incentive may not be fully understood or may
require complicated record keeping. In the former case, ws would
expect a strong effect of U on the probability of investing,
whereas in the latter case we'd expect a weak effect. We use the
NBER TAXSIM State Tax Calculator to compute t for individuals in
states with tax deductions.15
Our model allows for differences in across individuals.
We include two variables -heatingdegree days and homeownership
status -tocontrol for some of the determinants of .Energy
savings may be greater for individuals in colder states leading
to a positive correlation between heating degree days and the
We also zero out the federal deduction for the residential
energy tax credit when computing r with TAXSIN.This ensures
that there is no endogeneity between the computed tax rate and
the error term in the logit regression.
21probability of investing in conservation capital.16 We include a
homeownershiP variable since complete capitalization assures that
homeowners will appropriEIte the entire future stream of energy
savings whether they stay in the house or not. Even if
capitalization is incomplete, they will receive more of the
savings than renters who receive none of the savings once they
inove.7 Thus we argue that homeowners should be more likely to
invest than renters.
A third factor which we account for in the regression is the
observation that previous studies find an inverse relationship
between income and the estimated discount rate (e.g. Hausmari
(1979)) .Thiscould occur because of incomplete capital markets
for example. We include adjusted gross income (AGI) in the
regression with the expectation that it will have a positive
effect on the probability of investment.
We also include a dummy variable for California in the
regression. As noted above, California offers a generous credit
for conservation activity (40% of costs net of the federal
credit) .Thisfact indicates that California residents should be
less likely to claim the federal credit. In addition, we include
year dummies to control for business cycle effects -important
given the recessions of 1980 and 1981.
16 Data on heading degree days by state and year are from the
U.S. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration.
17 Moreover, if demand for rental housing is sufficiently
inelastic, then renters may receive little gain while renting as
the landlord may simply raise rents on the now more energy
efficient rental unit.
22Finally, we exclude observations on individuals with AGI
less than $10,000 in the regressions. Many individuals in this
group are not "life cycle" low income people but rather
"transitory" low incomedue to large business losses.It is
difficult to measure their tax price accurately; moreover, this
group may be most likely to take advantage of carry forward
provisions in the federal tax code which confounds our
measurement of the appropriate tax price driving their
investment.
Our first regression result is for the pooled sample, and is
reported in Table 5. The dependent variable is the dummy
variable indicating the presence of a credit for conservation
expenditures. We first discuss the non—price variables as their
effect is relatively stable across regressions. The probability
of investing goes up with income. Homeowners are more likely to
take a credit as are residents of states with colder climates
(more heating degree days). Each of these variables is
statistically significant with p-values less than .01. The
coefficient on the dummy variable for California is consistently
negative though not always statistically significant. These
results are consistent with results in earlier studies (e.g.
Dubin and Henson (1988) and Walsh (1989)).
Turning to the price and the tax price variables, we note
that bothhavethe wrong sign in the levels regression.One
reason that the price variables may not be explaining investment
very well is the presence of correlated individual effects in the
23error term. The conditional logit fixed effects regression
allows us to estimate the price effects consistently in the
presence of correlated fixed effects.We now turn to these
estinates. The price variable continues to have the wrong sign
but is now not significantly different from zero at the 5% level.
However, the tax price variable now has the correct sign and is
significant at the 5% level with a coefficient estimate of —2.39.
A decline in the tax price leads to an increase in the
probability of investment. Below we discuss how one should
interpret the economic importance of this coefficient estimate.
The last two regressions test for the robustness of the tax
price coefficient estimate. We begin by dropping the year
dutiies to ensure that important tax price information is not
being "soaked" up in the time effects. We note the statistical
importance of the time dummies as well as their economic
importance; business cycle effects are controlled for by these
variables.There is no appreciable change in the tax price
coefficient estimates and it appears that the year effects are
now being captured by the price variable which now becomes highly
significant (p value less than .01).
The last column tests for the possibility that the tax price
effect is a spurious result.One explanation for the negative
relationship between the tax price and the probability of
investment is that people anticipate the beginning of a new
program and delay investment until the program goes into effect.
While the net change in investment would be zero with the
24implementation of a program, the estimated coefficient on the tax
price variable would be negative. To test for this possibility,
we constructed a dummy variable equaling one if a state had a
program in effect the following year and zero otherwise. If
investment shifting were occurring, we should anticipate a
negative coefficient on this variable. The last regression
includes this variable.The estimated coefficient on the lead
tax variable is positive with a t statistic about 1 indicating
that tax timing is not driving our result.
How do we interpret the coefficient estimate on the tax
price variable? Based on the coefficient estimate of -2.39 and a
probability of investing equal to the mean of the data set
(.057), a 10% point decrease in the tax price leads to a 25%
increase in the probability of investing (.071). However, the
point made in the simulation section still stands: Tax credits in
the face of uncertain price may contribute to a large change in
the log odds of the probability of investing. However this does
not lead to a substantial increase in the probability itself,
given the small amount of investment to begin with.
We conclude from these regression results that state tax
incentives have an effect on the probability of investment which
is statistically significant. However the economic importance of
the programs is slight -aresult consistent with the simulations
based on the model of irreversible investment with price
uncertainty.
Both the simulation results and the empirical estimates cast
25doubt on the effectiveness of energy tax credits in stimulating
energy conservation investment in the presence of substantial
energy price uncertainty. In addition, the coefficient estimates
on the income and home ownership variables suggest that the
benefits of the credit accrue most to higher income individuals.
VI. Conclusion
In this paper, we've argued that residential energy
conservation investment should be treated as a form of
irreversible investment in the face of stochastic prices. Doing
so leads to a natural explanation of the low energy conservation
investment that occurred in the 1970s and l980s in response to
the residential energy conservation tax credit. Simulation
results show that price uncertainty of the magnitude observed
during the 70s and 80$ can drive conservation investment down to
levels approaching zero. A tax credit of the size given by the
federal residential energy tax credit will increase investment by
very small amounts over a ten to twenty year horizon.
We then consider a data set on roughly 38,000 individuals
followed over a three year period and find that the conservation
incentive programs offered by state governments in addition to
the federal program have a statistically significant effect on
investment once we control for individual (fixed) effects. Based
on our preferred estimate of the tax price coefficient, a 10
percentage point change in the tax price for energy investment
would lead to a 24% increase in the probability of energy
conservation investment. Bowever, given the low level of
26investment due to price uncertainty, the actual change in
investment is quite low -onthe order of a 1.5% increase in the
probability of investment.These results suggest that a tax
credit is not an effective tool for promoting conservation
investment. Put differently, the expiration of Residential
Energy Tax Credit in 1985 had very little effect on the overall
energy improvement adoption rate.If the rate of conservation
investment is suboptimal from the societal perspective, then the
challenge to policy makers now is to construct a more effective




Follow Geometric Brpwnipn Motion
We solve the problem of choosing the optimal investment time
to maximize energy savings when the price of energy and capital
investment follow geometric Brownian motions.First, we note
that we can apply Ito's Lemma to determine the stochastic motion
of the ratio P/K. Letting F(P,K) =P/K,
(Al) dF=FdP +FdK+.5(F(dp)2 +
Fk(dk)2+2Fk(dP)(dK))
where F refers to the partial derivative of F with respect to i.
substituting in the expressions for dP and dK (noting that
dz1dz=dt if i=jandpdt otherwise), we obtain the result that
(A2) dF =(A-M+o2-poo)(P/K)dt +
a(P/K)dz—o(P/k)dz.
F =P/Kfollows a geometric Brownian motion process with trend
(o) equals (p_k+o- P0P0k)andvariance (o) equal to (o+a
- 2poo').
Once the investment is made, the value of the investment
(conditional on energy price P), V, will equal P/(7—1) —K.
The investment is only made if P/K exceeds a trigger level h*.
* Atvalues of P/K below h ,theonly value of the energy
investment is in its option value, V(P,K) ,thatis
V(P,K) if P/K <h
(A3) V(P,K;h) =
_______ - Kif P/K a —
Todetermine the functional form of V1 we can construct the
28Bellman equation for the dynamic optimization problem described
in equation (5).Alternatively, an arbitrage argument requires
that:
(A4) iVdt=E(dV)
Homogeneity of degree 1 in prices allows us to rewrite the value
equation in terms of P/K and K. That is
(A5) V(P,K) =Kv(P/K).
If we rewrite V as a function of xP/K, we can apply Ito's
Lemma to dV and obtain
(AG) dV =Kv'dx+ .5Kv"(dx)2 + vdK
Substituting in (A4) above, taking expectations, dividing by dt
and letting dt go to zero gives us the differential equation
(A7) (- k)v=axv'+ .5cx2v"
where a is the drift for dx/x and o the variance of the
increment dx/x. We try a solution of the form Axb and find that
a solution exists for values of b which satisfy
(A8) .5ob(b—l)+ab—(i—j)=0.
Let Q(b) =•52b(b—l) + ab—(1—gik). Q(±) .Also,Q(0)
—
LL)which for historic data is likely to be negative.
Hence one root (b1) of the quadratic function Q(b) is negative.
If Q(1)a —(i—isalso negative, the second root (b2) is
greater than 1.Therefore, a general solution to the
differential equation is given by
(A9) v =A1xbl+ A2xb2
However, we can determine that A1 equals zero by the following
argument.Since x follows a geometric Brownian motion, if it
29ever reaches zero, it will remain there indefinitely. Hence v(O)
must equal 0 as the option to invest is now worthless. However,
since b1 C0,the first term in (A9) will be infinite unless A1
equals zero. Hence
(AlO) v =Axblb >1
We can use the smooth pasting and value matching conditions to
solve for h*.Value matching requires that the two expressions
for V in (A3) equate at h* and smooth pasting requires that they
meet smoothly at h* (see Dixit (1991)). Incorporating these
conditions yields the value of
* b7M
(All) h =— ______ b-l 6
Equivalently, it is optimal to make the investment when prices
change such that
b
(Al2) 6P a— (y—4) K
Mcdonald and Siegel (1986) show that in an investment problem of
this form, it is optimal to make the investment the first time
the trigger is hit.
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Source: The first 3 columns come from Statistics Income,
various years. Column 3 shows the fraction of returns each year
claiming the federal residential energy credit. The next 2
columns are computed by the authors. Column 4 shows the sampling
rule for the University of Michigan/Ernst and Young Tax Panel
while column 5 shows the fraction of returns each year claiming





1978 89,772 5843 6.51 — —
1979 92,694 4775 5.152,053 5.17
1980 93,902 4670 4.972,032 4.94
1981 95,396 3870 4.062,044 3.90
1982 95,337 3136 3.2910,323 3.28
1983 96,321 NA NA5,038 2.37
1984 99,439 NA NA10,186 2.41

































Table 2. Residential Credit Usage
by Income Group
AGI is adjusted gross income in thousands of dollars. These
statistics are computed by the authors from 38,121 returns for
1979.
34Table 3.
Conservation Expenditures Credit State
State Percentage Expenditures Credit
Alabama .060 331 49
Alaska .052 257 38
Arizona .035 384 57
Arkansas .048 780 96
California .021 762 101
Colorado .064 730 104
Connecticut .098 813 98
Delaware .080 359 53
D.C. .061 659 87
Florida .022 723 91
Georgia .039 428 58
Hawaii 0.0 —— ——
Idaho .052 266 40
Illinois .062 706 95
Indiana .048 641 91
Iowa .114 598 82
Kansas .055 449 58
Kentucky .067 747 87
Louisiana .029 677 89
Maine .095 342 51
Maryland .082 803 100
Massachusetts .098 695 93
Michigan .077 826 106
Minnesota .112 625 84
Mississippi .029 610 91
Missouri .071 527 69
Montana .098 587 88
Nebraska .051 708 105
Nevada .041 828 105
New Hampshire .039 299 45
New Jersey .086 695 94
New Mexico .058 899 98
New York .088 840 107
North Carolina .048 543 79
North Dakota .089 334 50
Ohio .060 652 88
Oklahoma .072 401 60
Oregon .063 878 127
Pennsylvania .071 698 95
Rhode Island .084 509 63
South Carolina .043 570 82
South Dakota .066 620 93
Tennessee .052 712 88
35Table 3 -Continued
State Percentage Expenditures Credit
Texas .035 760 91
Utah .057 385 156
Vermcnt .049 1202 156
Virginia .060 606 85
Washington .067 662 94
West Virginia .034 1104 .154
Wisconsin .093 453 62
Wyoming .046 586 88
This table reports the fraction of conservation credit takers and
average expenditures and credit for credit takers for tax payers
in the data set for 1979. Source: Authors' calculations.
36Table 4. Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Standard Minimum Maximum
Deviation
Credit Taken .057 .233 0 1
(dummy var)
Conservation 39.13 261.59 0 16970
Expenditures
Credit 5.04 28.71 0 301
(dollars)
AGI 18.55 16.33 —253.60 198.60
Homeowner .315 .464 0 1
(dummy var)
Heating 4.849 2.035 .783 10.420
Degree Days
Price 7.216 1.410 4.938 13.498
Tax Price .979 .067 .750 1.000
Summary statistics are for the 112,974 observations over the
three year period from 1979 through 1981.
37Table 5.RegressionResults
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Constant _4.407*
(.437)
Price _30.718 —20.38 _30.35* —22.46
(7.574) (12.44) (4.75) (12.63)
Tax Price 0.918* —2.393 —2.102 -2.577
(.367) (1.183) (1.180) (1.197)
Lead Taf .101
(.096)
AGI (x$1000) .00004* .0012* .0012* .0012*
(.000006) (.00025) (.00025) (.00025)
Homeowner 1.523* •944* .912* .942*
(.035) (.089) (.088) (.089)
Heating .013* .218* .296* .021*
Degree Days (.0001) (.0052) (.050) (.005)
California _.463* —.700 —.399 —.723
(.110) (.627) (.618) (.627)
Year —1979 .l47 .l96 .181
(.061) (.099) (101)
Year —1980 .251* .242 .238*
(.035) (.043) (.043)
Log—Like. —18523.7 —4451.0 —4467.1 —4450.4
Fixed Effects No Yes Yes Yes
-significantat the 5% level
* —significantat the 1% level
Regression results are for individuals in the 50 states plus the
District of Columbia followed over the three year period from
1979 through 1981.Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
An asterisk on a variable indicates a dummy variable.
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